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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VELMA GLADYS YATES, 
vs. 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
VERNAL FAMILY HEALTH CENTER, 
a project of the Division of 
Family and Community Medi-
cine, University of Utah; 
UINTAH COUNTY; UINTAH COUNTY 
HOSPITAL; VERNAL DRUG COM-
PANY, a Utah corporation; 
and GORDON LEE BALKA, M.D., 
Defendants-
Respondents. 
Case No. 16602 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
VERNAL FAMILY HEALTH CENTER 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced by plaintiff against defendants 
alleging injuries sustained as a result of various acts of health 
care malpractice. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
After written and oral arguments by all parties, the Honor-
able Allen B. Sorenson granted the motion of Vernal Family Health 
Center for dismissal based upon the failure of plaintiff to comply 
with the requirements of Utah Code Ann., Section 78-14-8, (1953 as 
amended) (R. 218, 234). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant Vernal Family Health Center seeks affirmance of the 
lower court's Order of Dismissal. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(The factual and legal issues addressed in this brief are 
those which relate to the respondent, Vernal Family Health Centei 
and are relevant to this appeal and no attempt is made to refer· 
the factual or legal issues unique to other respondents.) 
Appellant's statement of facts contains "facts" which are 
incorrect, without any factual basis in this record, and totally 
irrelevant to a determination in this appeal. For this reason, 
respondent chooses to submit its own statement of facts. In thi: 
appeal from a dismissal of appellant's complaint viewing the rec· 
ord in 1he light most favorable to the appellant, [McKay v. Salt 
Lake City, 547 P.2d 210, 211 (Utah 1976)], the following essentia: 
facts are established. 
In her complaint, the appellant, Velma Gladys Yates, allege:. 
that respondent, Vernal Family Health Center, was liable for 
"negligent diagnosis and treatment" of her through its employee, 
Gordon Lee Balka, M.D., also a respondent herein (R.3). The Ver. 
Family Health Center, as alleged, is a project of the Division1 
Family and Community Medicine of the College of Medicine, Unive: 
sity of Utah (R. l). It was established in 1975 as a demonstrat: 
project of e)remplary primary medical and heal th care in a remotE 
rural site. Its primary objective is to provide clinical train: 
for health professionals from the fields of medicine, nursing, 
pharmacy, social work, and health education while at the same 
time providing medical and health care (R.192). 
-2-
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Appellant alleged that Dr. Balka "permitted [her] to re-
ceive prescribed drugs and narcotics which resulted in plaintiff 
becoming addicted to same" (R.l). She further alleged that she 
was hospitalized for "drug overdose and abuse" on or about 
March 12, 1977 (R.2) but that after testing in ordinary re-
covery it was not discovered until March, 1978 that she was 
suffering permanent disorders resulting from the negligence of 
defendants (R.3). 
Paragraph 11 of appellant's complaint alleged: 
Timely claim and notice has been served upon the 
defendants, a copy of which is attached and by 
reference incorporated herein. (R. 3) 
The attached notice to which paragraph 11 refers is in the 
form of a letter dated April 7, 1978. However, it is not from 
the appellant but instead is signed by her husband and his 
attorney and reads as follows: 
April 7, 1978 
TO: Vernal Family Health Center 
Dr. Lee Balka 
Vernal Drug Company 
Uintah County Hospital 
Gentlemen: 
Pursuant to 78-14-8 UCA, notice is herewith 
given that Marzine Yates, husband of Velma Gladys 
Yates, potentially is asserting and claimi~g.and 
may commence a civil action for ~a~ages ari~ing 
out of possible negligent prescribing, negli<;Jent 
dispensing of drugs or other forms of prescribed 
medicine, and negligent hospitalization and treat-
ment of his wife. In compliance with the afore-
-3-
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said section of the Utah Code, it is believed and 
will be alleged in the event a civil action is 
conunenced that from approximately March, 1976 
until March,· 1978, claimant's wife received pres-
criptions from the Vernal Drug Company believed 
to have been prescribed by Dr. Lee Balka in his 
official capacity as a partner or responsible 
agent of the Vernal Family Health Center, which 
prescriptions, in combination of use or seperate, 
were dispensed in an excessive amount which has 
resulted in permanent mental damage to claimant's 
wife. It is further believed that as a result of 
the prolonged excess abuse of the prescription 
medication, the seizure and subsequent coma which 
claimant's wife suffered approximately one year 
ago were possibly the result of negligence. 
Claimant is unable to supply further informa-
tion about the details of the possible claim or 
the possible believed responsible parties until 
an exam of all the books and records of recipients 
of this notice has been accomplished. 
s/ 
Marzine Yates 
s/ 
Robert M. McRae 
Attorney for Claimant 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me on this 7th day of 
April, 1978. 
Except for the allegation in paragraph 11 of the complaint ili~ 
notice had "been served" there is no evidence on the face of th' 
document, nor any supporting documentation in the record as to 
manner, date or time of such alleged service, or the identityc 
the individual purportedly affecting such alleged service, on 1 
of the respondents generally or on Vernal Family Heal th Center 
specifically. 
-4-
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Furthermore, there is no allegation in the complaint or in 
any supporting documentation that any claim was made pursuant to 
the Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. Section 63-30-1 
(1953 as amended), either on the Vernal Family Health Center, the 
University of Utah, or the attorney general. (R.l, 107, 111-112) 
Vernal Family Health Center moved to dismiss the complaint 
on the basis that (1) plaintiff failed to comply with the notice 
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act, (2) plaintiff failed 
to comply with the notice requirements of the Health Care Malprac-
tice Act, (3) the Vernal Family Health Center is not a sui juris 
entity and, therefore, not a proper party, and (4) factually the 
complaint failed to state a cause of action against Vernal Family 
Health Center (R. 27-28, 106-109, 175-181). 
After providing an opportunity to counsel to brief and argue 
these issues before the Court, the Honorable Alan B. Sorenson, 
district judge, ruled on July 16, 1979 as follows: 
Plaintiff in reliance on Hatch v. Weber County, 
23 U.2 144, 459 P.2d 436, asserts that plaintiff 
complied substantially with the notice requirement 
of 78-14-8 UCA '53. Nothing in the record indicates 
that Velma Gladys Yates complied at all with the sta-
tutory notice requirement. Defendants'. motions to 
dismiss are granted. 
Because this ruling is dispositive, the Court 
does not reach other issues raised by defendants, 
Vernal Family Health Center and Uintah County. (R.218) 
Thereafter, on August 8, 1979, Judge Sorensen signed an Order 
dismissing plaintiff's complaint against Vernal Family Health Cen-
ter based on his ruling of July 16, 1979 regarding plaintiff's 
failure to comply with the notice requirement of Section 78-14-8, 
Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amended). 
-5-
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At no time in this case has the appellant, or anyone in~ 
behalf, alleged, petitioned for, or received a declaration that 
she is incompetent or needed a guardian or guardian ad litern. 
The only mention of this in the record is found in the minute 
entry of the pre-trial conference dated June 8, 1979 (R. 206-201 
At that time, Mr. Snow, counsel for Venal Drug Company, suggest: 
the need for the appointment of a guardian and the Court grante; 
the request of appellant's counsel to have a guardian ad ~ 
appointed. The record does not indicate, however, that this ha 
ever been accomplished. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DISMISSING 
APPELLANT'S ACTION AGAINST VERNAL FAMILY 
HEALTH CENTER FOR FAILING TO COMPLY WITH 
THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH'S HEALTH 
CARE MALPRACTICE ACT. 
A. APPELLANT, VELMA GLADYS YATES, DID NOT SERVE ANY NOTIC 
REQUIRED BY THE HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE ACT. 
Appellant relies on the letter of April 7, 1978 attached: 
her complaint as evidence of her compliance with the Utah Healt 
Care Malpractice Act notice requirements. However, comparingt 
letter with the requirements of the Act clearly shows that she 
failed to comply in any way with those requirements. 
The Utah Heal th Care Malpractice Act, Utah Code Ann. Sect: 
78-14-1 et seq. (1953 as amended) [all statutory references ar' 
to the Utah Code Ann.], first enacted by the 1976 Legislature, 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
L. 1976, Chapter 23, was enacted to deal with the "malpractice 
crisis" in ihe health care field. The Legislature specifically 
declared its findings and purposes in Section 78-14-2 to the 
effect that health care related suits, claims, judgments, and 
settlements had increased greatly, thus increasing the cost· and 
decreasing the availability of malpractice insurance. This, in 
turn, increased the cost and decreased the quality of available 
health care, all to the public's detriment. The purpose of the 
Act, in part, was to "alleviate the adverse effects" of these 
trends by establishing reasonable limitations on such actions and 
providing "other procedural changes to expedite early evaluation 
and settlement of claims". 
In addressing this problem, the Legislature provided for prior 
notice of intent to commence a malpractice action to be given to 
the health care provider. At the time appellant commenced her 
action, Section 78-14-8 provided, in part: 
No malpractice action against a health care 
provider may be commenced unless and until the 
plaintiff gives the prospective defendant or 
his executor or successor, at least 90 days 
prior notice of intent to commence an action. 
Such notice shall include the nature of the 
claim, the persons involved, the date, ·time and 
place of the occurrence, the circumstances there-
of, specific allegations of misconduct on the 
part of the prospective defendant, the nature of 
the alleged injuries and other damages sustained. 
Notice may be in letter or affidavit form execu-
ted by the plaintiff and his attorney. Service 
shall be accomplished by persons authorized and 
in the matter prescribed by Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure for the service of summons and complaint 
in a civil action. Such notice shall be served 
within the time allowed for commencing a malprac-
tice action against a health care provider. 
-7-
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This provision was amended slightly in 1979 (L. 1979, Ch. 128, 
Section 2) , but it remains essentially the same and those amend 
ments are not significant to a determination of this appeal. 
word "initiated" was substituted for "commenced" in the first 
sentence; the phrase "a general statement of" was inserted in 
the second sentence; the phrase "or his attorney" was substitut 
for the phrase "and his attorney" in the third sentence; a new 
provision for alternate service by certified mail was added in 
the fourth sentence. 
Appellant cites the case of Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d l! 
(Ut. 1979) in asserting that the notice she relies on dated Apr 
1978 should be interpreted in light of the statute as it was at> 
ed a year later. Foil indeed holds that procedural statutes m1 
be applied retroactively to causes of action that accrued prior 
the procedural amendments because there is no vested right in1 
future procedure. However, this reasoning does not apply in t! 
case where both the incident giving rise to the cause of actio: 
and the procedure its elf have preceded the procedural amendmen: 
Once the notice has been relied upon as allegedly prepared and 
served, and suit filed based thereon, that notice procedure "" 
Therefore, respondent, Vernal Family Health Center, maintains: 
the letter must be interpreted pursuant to the notice require~ 
as they then existed. However, as will be shown, the letter i 
clearly defective under either criteria. 
Recent rulings of this Court make it clear that complianc 
with the notice provision is mandatory relative to a malpractic 
action against a health care provider. Foil v. Ballinger, 60' 
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P.2d 144 (Ut. 1979); Vealey v. ~. 579 P.2d 919 (Ut. 1978). 
Section 78-14-3 (1) defines "health care provider" as "any •• 
facility or institution who causes to be rendered •.• health 
care or professional services. II Respondent Vernal Family 
Health Center clearly falls under the protections of the Utah 
Health Care Malpractice Act. 
Section 78-14-8 required the notice to be "executed by the 
plaintiff and his attorney". However, that notice is signed by 
one, Marzine E. Yates, appellant's husband, as "claimant" and 
Robert M. Mccrae as "attorney for claimant", giving notice of 
Marzine Yates' intent to assert his claim. Marzine Yates has 
never filed a malpractice action against Vernal Family Health 
Center. There is no suggestion in the notice or anywhere else 
in the record that Marzine Yates acted as appellant's guardian or 
representative or in any other than his own capacity. 
Furthermore, assuming, arguendo, the notice could have been 
signed in the alternative by either "plaintiff or his attorney" 
under the 1979 amendments, the fact that Robert M. McRae signed 
as attorney for Marzine Yates does not suggest in any way that 
he was also signing as attorney for Velma Gi°adys Yates. If at 
that time he also represented Velma Gladys Yates for this or any 
other purpose, that capacity is nowhere reflected in the record, 
and his signature as attorney for Marzine Yates could not affect 
notice in behalf of her or anyone else who also might happen to 
be his client at the time. 
-9-
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Further deficiencies in the notice are referred to infra, 
at Point I. B., but it is clear, without more, that the plantif 
(appellant) and her attorney had to give notice of her intentt 
commence action. Neither she nor her attorney signed it and it 
did not give any notice of her intent to do anything. Therefor. 
appellant's action was properly dismissed. 
B. ASSUMING,ARGUENDO, THE ALLEGED NOTICE HAD BEEN SIGNED 
BY VELMA GLADYS YATES AND HER ATTORNEY, IT STILL WOULD NOT HAW 
SATISFIED THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE HEALTH CARE MALPRACTIC 
ACT. 
Because the Health Care Malpractice Act is a recent enactr 
respondent Vernal Family Health Center is not aware of any cas1 
which directly consider the criteria for the sufficiency of a 
notice under that Act. The recent cases of Vealey v. ~. s· 
P.2d 919 :ut. 1978) and Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144 (Ut. 1 
refer to the effective date and timeliness of the notice butd 
not address the suficiency except to make it clear that the no: 
is, in fact, mandatory and cannot be satisfied by the mere fil 
of the complaint itself, Vealey v. Clegg, supra. 
Point I. A., supra, establishes that the most basic requi 
ment, that the plaintiff give notice of her intent, was ignore 
However, assuming, arguendo, that appellant and her attorney I 
signed the notice in question, a step-by-step analysis of the: 
ute relative to the alleged notice clearly shows the insuffic 
of that notice. 
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The statute requires "notice of intent to conunence an action". 
However, there is no such notice of intent at all, but only a state-
ment that the claimant "potentially is asserting and claiming and 
may commence a civil action for damages arising out of possible 
negligent prescribing of drugs ••• of his wife". The words, 
"potentially", "may", "possible", all suggest that his suspicions 
have not yet ripened into an "intent to commence action". 
The notice must include "the nature of the claim •• speci-· 
fie circumstances thereof, specific allegations of misconduct". 
The only arguable "claim" relative to Vernal Family Health Center 
is for "damages arising out of possible negligent prescribing • • 
of drugs •.• of his wife". There is no further statement whatso-
ever of "specific circumstances" nor "specific allegations of mis-
conduct" relative to Vernal Family Health Center or Dr. Balka. In 
this regard, the letter impliedly acknowledges this very deficiency 
by the statement that: 
Claimant is unable to supply further information 
about the details of the possible claim or the 
possible believed responsible parties until an 
exam of all the books and records. 
The medical records of Velma Gladys Yates were available to her 
attorney or physician prior to her filing of an action. To the 
extent Marzine Yates had any assertable rights, the records would 
be available to him also. Nevertheless, the letter by Marzine 
and subsequent complaint by appellant were apparently prepared with-
out substantial prior review of the medical records. It is this 
very kind of action that the Health Care Malpractice Act was en-
acted to prevent. 
-11-
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This notice should have been served in the ::-.a:mer pres-
cribed for the service of surnnons and co=:iplaint in a civil 
action. Nowhere on the face of the notice, nor in the compla::.: 
nor in any other supporting documentation is there any indica::: 
or allegation that the notice was served pursuant to Rule 4 o:: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The record contains no hint o: 
cor:ipliance with the requisite formalities of the nanner of ser· 
vice [Rule 4 (e)], the manner of proof of service including a 
certificate or affidavit of the server [Rule 4 (g)] or endorse· 
ment of date of service, name and title of server on the copy 
left with the person being served [Rule 4 (j)]. 
The alternate manner of service now provided under the 1;· 
amend!nents is by certified mail, return receipt requested. T:., 
record does not contain any indication of such mailing and re:. 
receipt, nor any mailing certificate at all . 
. i;ppellant states at page 10 of her brief that "it is not 
disputed that each respondent received actual notice of tli.e c:. 
However, although Vernal Fa~ily Health Center is here on its: 
to dismiss and has not specifically answered such allegation, 
does not concede in any manner that a copy of this or any oth: 
letter was actually received, nor that "actual notice o:: the: 
of Velma Gladys Yates was received. 
Appellant attempts to justi::y "substantial co;-;ipliance" c: 
"sufficient compliance" with the notice requirements of 78-1;· 
on the basis of Hatc::i. v. \\"eber Co:l..!t'-·, 23 Ct. 2d l.;4, 459 p,.: 
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436 (1969). As already noted, supra, there was no compliance at 
all, neither "actual", "substantial", "statutory", "sufficient", 
or any other compliance and the alleged notice itself is grossly 
deficient. Furthermore, the case of Hatch v. Weber County, supra, 
to the extent it may suggest that "substantial compliance" with 
some notice requirements is sufficient, is easily distinguishable 
on at least three bases. First, unlike appellant, the plaintiffs 
in the Hatch case (both attorneys, one of which, by coincidence, 
is appellant's attorney) actually attempted to serve notice on 
the county. The claim was properly made out for legal services 
they, in fact, performed. However, they served the County Com-
missioners, County Clerk and County Attorney rather than the 
County Auditor as Section 17-15-10 required. Second, unlike Sec-
tion 78-14-8, that statute specifically required the county to 
notify a claimant if the notice were deficient, and the county 
never did so. Third, as this Court pointed out in Hatch, that 
particular claim did not involve the usual tort claim where evi-
dence of fault or lack thereof is involved, but only involved a 
fee for services (459 P.2d at p. 438). The present case does 
involve such evidentiary matters. Hatch v. Weber County is 
clearly inapplicable. 
In summary, the letter is not signed by the plaintiff nor 
her attorney, it does not refer to her claim, it does not give 
notice of any real intent to commence a malpractice action, it 
does not contain any statement of specific circumstances or 
specific allegations of misconduct, and was not served pursuant 
-13-
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to the statute. Thus, it is totally insufficient to comply 
with the notice requirements of the Health Care Malpractice Act 
and appellant's action was properly dismissed. 
C. THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE HEALTH CARE MALPRACTICE 
ACT ARE CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Appellant has alleged that the notice requirements of. the 
Health Care Malpractice Act are unconstitutional in violationc 
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution 
(Amendment XIV, Section 1), the equal protection clause of the 
Utah State Constitution (Article I, Section 2) , the requirement 
that "all laws of a general nature shall have uniform operatior 
(Utah Constitution Article I, Section 24), and the provision tl. 
"no private or special law shall be enacted where a general la1 
can be applicable" (Utah Constitution Article VI, Section 26). 
Issues relative to these provisions are usually considered to· 
gether by this Court. The standards of "equal protection" usu: 
are found to encompass the considerations of "special laws" an: 
"uniform application". Leatham v. McGuinn, 524 P.2d 323 (Ut.: 
Cannon v. Oviatt, 520 P.2d 883 (Ut. 1974) app. dism. 419 U.S. 
95 s.ct. 24, 42 L. Ed. 2d 37, reh. den. 419 u.s. 1060, 95 s.ct 
42 L. Ed. 2d G58 (1974). 
The test to be applied to legislation in such a case wher 
legislative classification is attacked as a violation of equal 
tection is whether or not there is a rational basis for suchc 
fication. Legislation is presumed to be constitutional. sear 
-
Southworth, 563 P.2d 192 (Ut. 1977); Leatham v. McGuinn, ~ 
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Cannon v. Oviatt, supra. 
As noted in Point I. A., the Legislature carefully and ex-
plicitly enunciated its findings and reasons for the enactment 
of the Utah Health Care Malpractice Act and the means selected 
bear a reasonable and rational relationship toihe objectives to 
be accomplished. 
In fact, this Court has implicitly, if not explicitly, 
already ruled on the constitutionality of the Act relative to 
equal protection. In the case of McGuire v. University of Utah 
Medical Center, 603 P.2d 786 (Ut. 1979), this Court had before 
it an appeal from a dismissal for failure to file the proper 
notice in a case which arose prior to the effective date of the 
Malpractice Act. Relative to the claim that the 1979 amendments 
constituted a "special law" in violation of the Utah Constitution 
Article VI, Section 26, this Court held that the amendments were 
constitutional as uniformly applied general laws and implied that 
the basic act itself, along with the amendments, was valid. This 
Court stated: 
The amendment does not rest on an arbitrary classi-
fication; it makes no invidious discrimination, and 
it applies uniformly to all within the.class. The 
amendment merely differentiates between those clas-
ses of persons to whom the notice of intent to sue 
provision applies and those to whom it does not 
apply based onthe effective date of the Malpractice 
Act. It is within the power of the legislature to 
make such a classification when enacting clarifying 
legislation designed to avoid hardship and inju7t~ce. 
The principles of notice and fair play are sufficient 
to justify the classification in this ~ase .. Indee~, 
it would be anomalous to hold that legislation design-
ed to clarify a previous enactment is special legisla-
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tion unless the earlier enactment were also special 
legislation.- See also State.v. Kallas, 97 Ut. 492, 
94 P .2d 414 (1939). (emphasis added) 
By this reasoning, the Health Care Malpractice Act is clearly cc 
stitutional. 
Appellant cites the case of Jones v. State Board of Medicit 
97 Id. 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976) cert. den. 431 U.S. 914, 97 s. c 
2173, 53 L. Ed. 2d 223 (1977) for the proposition that the teH 
legislation relative to an equal protection argument is not the 
"rational basis" test but a more restrictive "means scrutiny" te 
asenunciated in Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 92 s. Ct. 251, 30 L. 
2d 225 (1971). This test "focuses upon the relationship betwee: 
the subject legislation and the object or purpose to be served 
thereby" (id., 555 P. 2d at page 407). Even if this more restri: 
ive view were maintained, in light of the extensive legislative 
findings and purpose and the rational relationship between thos' 
purposes and the means provided in the statute, this legislatior. 
would be upheld. Nevertheless, this Court has never adopted tl 
theory and the facts of this case do not suggest that it is ap· 
propriate to do so. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that even in Jones v. ~ 
Board of Medicine, supra, under the more restrictive test the 
Court did not invalidate Idaho's Hospital-Medical Liability Ac: 
but remanded for further consideration only on that portion of: 
Act which limited recovery in such actions, an issue which is· 
at all present in this appeal. 
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The Idaho Court emphasized that they did not intend to aban-
don "the traditional restrained view standard of equal protection 
tests of legislation" and emphasized that "the burden of showing 
the absence of a reasonable relationship under the means-focus 
test remains with the one who assails the classification" (id. 555 
P.2d at page 407). In the present case, appellant has not even 
attempted to sustain this traditional burden but, instead, attempts 
to shift the burden by requiring a showing by those attempting to 
sustain the legislation, absent which, appellant suggests the Act 
cannot stand. See page 20 of appellant's brief. Such a shifting 
of burden under the rational basis test, or even under the "means-
focus" test, is without basis in practice or logic. 
The Utah Health Care Malpractice Act is constitutional in 
every way. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM AGAINST VERNAL FAMILY 
HEALTH CENTER IS BARRED BECAUSE SHE FAILED 
TO COMPLY WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF 
THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT. 
Although several of the respondents, including Vernal Family 
Health Center, raised the issue in District _Court of compliance 
~ with various notice requirements relative to governmental entities, 
the District Court did not reach those issues (R. 218). However, 
in the order submitted by Uintah County and Unitah County Hospital, 
these issues purport to form part of the basis for the dismissal, 
and appellant addresses these issues in her brief. Since Vernal 
Family Health Center is also a governmental entity and raised in 
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the District Court the issue of compliance with the Governmental 
Immunity Act, respondent hereby responds to this issue. 
A. VERNAL FAMILY HEALTH CENTER IS A GOVERNMENTAL ENTITY 
UNDER THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT TO WHICH NOTICE MUST BE Givt 
PRIOR TO SUIT AND NO SUCH NOTICE WAS GIVEN. 
The Utah Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. Sec;:tion 
63-30-1 et ~ (1953 as amended) establishes the procedural an: 
substantive criteria upon which the State of Utah waives its irr· 
rnunity from suit. Section 63-30-2 (1) defines "state" as meanir 
• • the state of 
agency, authority, 
hospital, college, 
ali ty thereof. 
Utah or any office, department, 
commission, board, institution, 
university or other instrument-
• (emphasis added) 
As a project of the University of Utah College of Medicine 
created, controlled, and funded through the University of Utah, 
the Vernal Family Health Center falls within the definition of 
"state". 
The scope of the activities covered by the Act is defined 
Section 63-30-3 as follows: 
Except as may be otherwise provided in this act, 
all governmental entities are immune from suit 
for any injury which results from the exercise 
of a governmental function, governmentally-owned 
hospital~ nursing home, or other governmental 
health care facility. (L 1978, Chapter 27, Sec-
tion 2) 
Appellant's alleged injury resulted from the exercise of a 
governmental function, governmentally-owned hospital, and/ore 
governmental heal th care facility, and her claim is clearly gc 
erned by the Governmental Immunity Act. 
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Section 63-30-11 requires the filing of a written notice of 
claim with a governmental entity prior to such a suit and within 
the applicable time period. It also provides for extension of 
time for filing such notice in the case of a minor, mental in-
competent without guardian, or prisoner as permitted by the court 
"in its discretion". 
Section 6 3-30-12 provides: 
A claim against the state is barred unless notice 
of claim is filed with the attorney general and the 
agency concerned within one year after the cause of 
action arises. 
Sections 63-30-14 and 15 further establish that a suit may not 
be filed until after the claim has been submitted, denied, or until 
90 days after such filing. 
It is important to note that these provisions apply in addi-
tion to those provisions of the Health Care Malpractice Act. Sec-
tion 78-14-10 of the Health Care Malpractice Act specifically pro-
vides that: 
The provisions of this act shall apply to malprac-
tice actions against health care providers which 
are brought under the Utah Governmental Immunity 
Act insofar as they are applicable; provided, how-
ever, that this act shall in no way affect the re-
quirements for filing notices of claims, times for 
commencing actions and limitations on amounts re-
coverable under the Utah Governmental Immunity Act. 
It is a well-settled law in the state of Utah that failure to 
comply with the statutory notice requirements of the Utah Govern-
o mental Irrununity Act is a fatal and jurisdictional defect such that 
gc any such claim is barred. Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2d 192 (Ut. 
1977); ~rowder v. Salt Lake County, 552 P.2d 646 (Ut. 1976); Scar-
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borough v. Granite School Distr:ict, 531 P.2d 480 (Ut. 1975); Edwa, 
---:; 
v. Iron County, 531 P.2d 476 (Ut. 1975); Varoz v. Sevey, 29 u. 
158, 506 P.2d 435 (1973), Roosendaal Construction and Mining Corr,. 
--~ v. Holman, 28 u. 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 (1972). 
The case of Sears v. Southworth, supra, involved a third-pa,, 
complaint against the State Highway Department. arising out of a 
highway accident wherein the defendant in the original action al· 
leged State negligence in a third-party complaint. Because the 
initial complaint was not served until 18 months after the acck 
the defendant did not file notice with the State within the one·:r 
limitation. Citing Scarborough v. Granite School District, supr 
and Varoz v. Sevey, supra, this Court held the third party actic 
was barred for failure to file timely notice. 
The case of Scarborough v. Granite School District, supra, 
involved injury to a child from fallen wires on a school ground. 
The mother had spoken with the principal of the school and heh 
filed a written report of the incident, but the mother had file: 
no formal claim. The Court stated: 
We have consistently held that where a cause of 
action is based on a statute, full compliance 
with its requirements is a condition precedent 
to the right to maintain a suit. 
531 P.2d at page 482. 
In the case of Varoz v. Sevey, supra, the plaintiff, thro. 
a mistake, filed with the State instead of the County, thereby 
missing the County filing deadline. In spite of this inadvert: 
error, and the fact that the County appeared to have had actua 
knowledge of the circumstances through its own investigation, 
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court stated: 
Actual knowledge of the circumstances which re-
sul ~e~ in the death of the plaintiff's mother by 
officials of the County does not dispense with 
the necessity of filing a timely claim. 
506 P.2d at page 436. 
In the present case, the only notice which purports to have 
been given was that signed by the husband of the appellant "pur-
suant to 78-14-8 UCA". Such notice under §78-14-8, the Health 
Care Malpractice Act, does not dispense with the notice require-
rnents under the Governmental Immunity Act (Section 78-14-10). 
Although the Vernal Family Health Center is an instrumentality of 
the University of Utah and the State of Utah, and the appellant so 
alleged in her complaint, she made no attempt to comply with the 
statutory notice requirements cited above. No notice under Sec-
tion 63-30-11 was given to the State of Utah, the Attorney Gen-
eral's Office, the University of Utah, or the Vernal Family Health 
Center. Therefore, appellant's complaint against Vernal Family 
Health Center is barred. 
Appellant addresses the issue of the timeliness and the 
tolling provisions relative to the Governmental Immunity Act. 
Inasmuch as she has not alleged that any such notice was ever 
filed, and the court ruling did not rely on her failure to give 
such notice, the timeliness is not even an issue. However, in 
partial response to appellant's brief, it is clear from Section 
63-30-11, supra, that any extension of time for such filing due 
to an alleged mental incompetence may be granted only by the 
Court in its discretion. Appellant has never attempted to file 
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any notice, has never attempted to approach the Court for an 
extension of time to do so, and has never alleged that she was 
mentally incompetent or needed the appointment of a guardian 
or guardian ad litem. 
B. THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY 
ACT ARE CONSTITUTIONAL. 
Appellant alleges at page 16 of her brief that the notice 
requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act violate the equal 
protection provisions of the Utah and United States Constitutic: 
As already referred to above, Point I. C., the criteria us: 
by this Court in reviewing such a statute for its compliance ~ 
the equal protection clause is that a statute is presumed const: 
tutional and if there is a "rational basis" for the classifictt 
it will be upheld by the courts. Sears v. Southworth, 563 P.2: 
192 (Ut. 1977); Crowder v. Salt Lake County, 552 P.2d 646 (Ut. 
1976). The question of whether the notice requirements of the 
Governmental Immunity Act violate the equal protection clausec 
the Utah and United States Constitutions has already been befo: 
this Court in the case of Sears v. Southworth, supra. This Co. 
stated, at 556 P.2d, page 193-194: 
This court has heretofore articulated the rationale 
of the notice of claim requirement. Among other 
reasons, notice of claim provides the governmental 
unit with the opportunity to properly investigate 
and remedy any defect immediately, before additional 
injury is caused; it helps avoid unnecessary litiga-
tion; it minimizes difficulties that might arise 
from changes in administrations. See e.g., Scar-
borough v. Granite School District, Ut. 531 P.2d 
480 (1975), and Gallegos v. Midvale, 27 Ut. 2d 27, 
492 P.2d 1335 (1972). 
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While aware that some state courts have invalidated 
simila~ notice of claim requirements, holding that 
they violate equal protection, this court is not 
prepared to do so, finding rational basis for the 
classification. 
There is a rational basis for the notice requirements. Ap-
pellant never even attempted to comply with such requirements and 
her claim is barred. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court was correct in dismissing appellant's claim 
for failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Health 
Care Malpractice Act. Neither appellant, nor anyone acting in her 
behalf, filed any notice of intent required by that statute. Fur-
thermore, even the letter relied upon by appellant, which lists 
someone else as claimant, is itself deficient in almost every 
respect. 
Appellant failed to comply, or even allege compliance, with 
the notice requirements of the Governmental Immunity Act. Those 
provisions apply to the respondent Vernal Family Health Center and 
appellant's claim is barred for failure to so comply. 
The notice requirements of both the Health Care Malpractice 
Act and the Governmental Immunity Act are constitutional in every 
respect. 
For these reasons, the judgment of the lower court dismissing 
appellant's complaint should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
R BERT B. HANSEN, Attorney General 
WILLIAM T. EVANS, Ass't. Att. Gen. 
25 South Wolcott 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Attorney for Respondent, Vernal 
Family Health Center 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
i 
Two copies of the foregoing "Brief of Respondent Vernal Family I 
Health Center" was mailed first class United States mail this 
~day of February, 1980 to: 
Robert M. Mccrae 
72 East Fourth South, #355 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Leonard Russon 
702 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
John H. Snow 
700 Continental Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
D. Gary Christian 
600 Commercial Club Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Gayle F. McKeachnie 
53 South 200 East 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
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